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Abstract 
 Th is response to Dr Plant engages with important issues regarding the possibility of 
using the work of Emmanuel Levinas as a theological tool and resource. Levinas ‘and’ 
theology is both an important conjunction and disjunction. Th e distinction between 
a theology that is fundamental and a theology that is dogmatic needs to be stressed. 
Levinas’ ethical metaphysics, and his recognition of the need for a theological recu-
peration of the ethics he espouses, opens up a possible and fundamental theological 
dialogue which recognizes the fundamental and salviﬁc importance of the ordinary 
and the everyday in human existence. 
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 Dr Plant’s review is welcome, and I am grateful for the opportunity to respond 
to some of the important points he raises in his critique of Levinas and Th eol-
ogy. Th ere are indeed ‘questions about Levinas’ work’ (including its theological 
signiﬁcance) that arise. 
 Levinas and Th eology 
 A preliminary remark to situate the work: ‘and’ can be such a problematical 
word, as in ‘Levinas and Th eology’. ‘And’ operates both conjunctively and dis-
junctively. It attempts to associate diﬀerence, to connect the unconnected, but 
perhaps not with a view to reconciliation. I am reminded of Dondeyne’s early 
article, ‘Inleiding tot het denken van E. Levinas’, soon after the publication of 
Totality and Inﬁnity, in which he stresses the signiﬁcance of ‘and’.1 It is not 
1)  Albert Dondeyne, ‘Inleiding tot het denken van E. Levinas’,Tijdschrift voor Filosoﬁe, 25:3–4 
(1963), 555–584 at 555. 
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Totality or Inﬁnity, but Totality and Inﬁnity, for Levinas never denies totality 
but subjugates it to inﬁnity. Th e Inﬁnity of the other person is beyond but 
remains related to the totality of being. Th e question is one of understanding 
the relation. In similar but much lesser vein, it is Levinas and Th eology, and the 
kind of conversation that might be possible between them. Levinas, interro-
gating Heidegger, asks whether ontology is fundamental, and his conclusion is 
that ethics, not ontology, is fundamental. What I want to argue is that for a 
theology that would be fundamental or foundational, it is ethics not ontology 
that is also fundamental: there is, as Levinas suggests, ‘an original ethical event 
which would also be ﬁrst theology’.2  
 Now, the question of foundations sits uneasily in a post-modern environ-
ment in which foundations and canons are proscribed. No one thought or 
perspective can be privileged over another. Yet, Levinas may be depicted as a 
foundationalist beyond any foundation that is ontological. For Levinas, the 
foundation or the canon is inscribed in the face of an other person, and no 
one person can be privileged over another: ethics is the risk of comparing 
incomparables, and the trace of absolute alterity in the face of the other is 
indecipherable other than by way of response and responsibility. Such a 
non-foundational foundationalism—ethics by any other name—is perhaps 
addressed by Jean-Luc Marion, particularly where intuition exceeds inten-
tion.3 But perhaps the notion of ‘foundation’ is the original ontological fault: 
origin may be a better way of proceeding. Th e other comes ﬁrst. 
 Fundamentals and Origins 
 Levinas has an allergic reaction to theology, just as he has an allergic reaction 
to mysticism. Th eology is theory and attempts to capture the creator-God as 
concept, thereby transgressing the transcendence of God. Mysticism attempts 
an immediate relation with God. In both, the world is by-passed, and the 
other person is passed by just as the man on the road from Jericho was passed-
by by all but the Samaritan traveller. For Levinas, the world cannot be by-passed; 
it is the necessary detour. As Levinas notes in Totality and Inﬁnity, ‘ “Th e true 
2)  Emmanuel Levinas, Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas (California: Stan-
ford University Press, 2001), p. 182. 
3)  See Jean-Luc Marion, Le visible et le révélé (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2005) for an accessible 
exposition of Marion’s reworking of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Th e work is currently only 
available in French. 
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life is absent”. But we are in the world’.4 Th is world, however, needs to be 
construed in terms of ethics rather than ontology, and any attempt to give a 
theological account of being-in-the world needs also to be articulated in terms 
of ethics, not ontology. ‘Without the signiﬁcation they draw from ethics, 
theological concepts remain empty and formal frameworks’,5 and thus ethics, 
as Levinas states, is ‘ﬁrst theology’. Th is notion of ethics as ‘ﬁrst theology’ 
comes late in Levinas’ reﬂection in an interview published in Is It Righteous to 
Be? For the most part Levinas’ criticism of theology is aimed at the speculative 
and dogmatic, and it could be argued that his aversion to theology matches his 
aversion to ontology, an onto-theo-logical aversion. However, what Levinas 
reacts against, it seems to me, is dogmatic theology rather than fundamental 
theology. It is the notion of ‘ﬁrst’ or fundamental theology that I wish to stress 
and clarify. 
 Generally speaking (but not wholly), it would be fair to say that the notion 
of fundamental theology (as opposed to dogmatic theology) is more familiar 
in a catholic theological environment than in a reformed theological environ-
ment, just as the relationship of phenomenology and theology tends to be 
more predominant in that environment also. Fundamental theology would 
consider more the existential structures of human experience and theological 
method, and how these open on to the possibility of saying something about 
God. Following David Tracy, in Th e Analogical Imagination, we can distin-
guish fundamental theology, systematic theology and practical theology.6 Fun-
damental theologies seek ‘to provide arguments that all reasonable persons . . . 
can recognise as reasonable’, and therefore has recourse to ‘experience, intelli-
gence, rationality, and responsibility’.7 Fundamental theologies privilege that 
critical enquiry which is ‘proper to its academic setting’.8 Although related to 
systematic and practical theologies and sharing their concerns, fundamental 
theologies, tend to ‘abstract themselves from all religious ‘faith commitments’ 
for the legitimate purpose of critical analysis of all religious and theological 
4)  Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Inﬁnity (Th e Hague: M. Nijhoﬀ, 1979), p. 33. 
5)  Ibid., p. 37. 
6)  David Tracy, Th e Analogical Imagination (London: SCM Press, 1981). Avery Dulles likewise 
notes, ‘Fundamental theology . . . is predogmatic because . . . it does not rest on a ﬁnished theory 
regarding revelation and its mediation through tradition and ecclesiastical pronouncements. 
Rather, by fashioning such a theory, it contributes to the foundations for dogmatic theology’ 
(A. Dulles, Models of Revelation (New York: Orbis, 1992), p. 15). 
7)  Ibid., p. 57. 
8)  Ibid. 
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claims’.9 Further, with regard to meaning and truth claims, fundamental the-
ologies, in attempting to have a genuinely public character, have a concern 
with the ‘adequacy or inadequacy of truth claims’ of a tradition, and will 
engage with other disciplines in the humanities.10 Th us, fundamental theology 
is often spoken of as philosophical theology.11 It is in this context of working 
towards a fundamental theology that Levinas’ emphasis on ethics is particu-
larly helpful. Levinas, it seems to me, oﬀers the possibility of a fundamental 
theology ‘drawn from ethics’, and an ethical voice and grammar by which to 
decline the theological subject of modernity in terms of intersubjectivity and 
responsibility: the ‘I’ confronted with the other person becomes declined as 
me, and for and to and towards. Levinas’ ethical emphasis declines the ego-
centred subject of modernity, and chooses to decline the subject in terms of 
alterity. Th e existential structure of subjectivity is marked by an openness to 
alterity, an openness that is eﬀected by the ingress of the other into my exis-
tence. Th e other person arrives on my doorstep unannounced. 
 Now, although the notion of fundamental theology is important, to speak 
of foundations could be seen as an attempt to rescue the ontological structures 
of existence; thus, the diﬃculty of concluding whether Levinas works towards 
an otherwise than being or a being otherwise. My own view on this would be 
that it is the otherwise than being—the ethical incursion of the other person 
rather than his or her being ontologically positioned—that provokes a being 
otherwise in which responsibility for the other person is the imperative that 
guides the working for justice and the transformation of the structures of 
society. My own view increasingly is that one should speak not so much about 
foundations, but about origins. ‘First theology’ relates to an ethical event that 
is ‘original’.12  
 We can see this insight into origin in Levinas’ stress on the anteriority of the 
posterior, or, the strange logic of causes coming after their eﬀects. Although 
Levinas’ phenomenological, intersubjective reduction must also start from the 
here of consciousness, thought discovers that it is not its own origin, but is 
provoked by that which is posterior yet only come upon lately. Th ought would 
seem to be anterior to its object, but, in eﬀect, it is provoked by a precedent or 
prevenient. As Jean-Luc Marion will stress, taking Levinas even further, the 
phenomenon gives itself to thought, with an excess of intuition over intention. 
 9)  Ibid. 
10)  Ibid. 
11)  Ibid. 
12)  Levinas, Is It Righteous to Be?, p. 182. 
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 Items Raised in the Review 
 Religion and Religiosity 
 To turn more particularly to items raised in the review: is religion reduced to 
‘religiosity’? Not necessarily so; as long as one keeps religion as responsible 
hearing and doing to the fore, although admittedly there comes a stage at 
which faith enters in. Ethics is not excluded from the praeparatio evangelium, 
and a phenomenological approach to religion can open on to the possibility of 
fundamental theology. Merold Westphal puts it well, in reference to Marion: 
‘Th e diﬀerence between phenomenology and theology is that what the theo-
logian aﬃrms on the basis of faith as actual, the phenomenologist merely 
describes as possible . . . As a theory of possibility [phenomenology] remains 
neutral with respect to actuality’.13  
 Philosophy and Scripture 
 Levinas recognizes two basic languages: Greek and Hebrew; a philosophical 
canon and a scriptural canon. However, in so far as both philosophy and 
Scripture are trying to make sense of the one human existential, both share a 
common concern. Scripture can also be read phenomenologically insofar as it 
gives an insight into human existence and transcendence, and the attempt at 
a human relation with God.14  
 It is true that Judaism (as also Christianity) does have a particular singular-
ity. However, Levinas should not be read as privileging a particular religious 
tradition. In fact, a counter-criticism could be raised against Levinas: in his 
account of the ‘other’, he removes the other from his or her particular histori-
cal and cultural context. One sees this in ‘Meaning and Sense’ in Humanism 
of the Other, where he states that ‘[s]igniﬁcation is before Culture and Aesthet-
ics; it is situated in Ethics, presupposition of all Culture and all signiﬁcation. 
Morality does not belong to Culture; it allows us to judge culture, to evaluate 
the dimension of its elevation. Elevation ordains being’.15 As original, ethics 
13)  M. Westphal, ‘Transﬁguration as a Saturated Phenomenon’, Journal of Philosophy and Scrip-
ture, 1:1 (2003), 26–35 at 28. 
14)  André Th ayse, for example, has an interesting exegetical series on the four gospels which open 
up the phenomenological dimension of the gospels. (A. Th ayse, Matthieu, Marc, Luc, Jeanne: 
L’ Evangile revisité (Brussels: Editions Racine, 1997–2001). 
15)  Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2003), p. 36. 
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makes signiﬁcation—even cultural signiﬁcation—and the judgement of cul-
tures possible. 
 Now, this could be criticized for failing to recognize the role and value of 
culture and history. However, Levinas does not deny the importance of cul-
tural expression. His key point is that ethics, which makes signiﬁcation pos-
sible, calls culture to give an account of itself. Ethics not cultural expression 
should not determine or dictate how another is either viewed or treated. So: 
 Expression is a relation with the one to whom I express expression and whose 
presence is already required in order that my cultural gesture of expression can be 
produced. Th e Other who faces me is not included in the totality of being that is 
expressed . . . He is neither a cultural signiﬁcation nor a simple given. He is, pri-
mordially, sense because he lends it to expression itself, because only through him 
can a phenomenon such as signiﬁcation introduce itself, of itself, into being.16 
 I can appreciate why he does this, as being determined by history and culture 
can often lead to the violence and exclusion that is current in modern societ-
ies, beset as they are with the rise of nationalism and the limiting of immigra-
tion, and the tendency to promote the totality of the same over the inﬁnity of 
the other. 
 Ethical Access to the Other 
 Plant claims that my statement that the ‘other’ is not directly accessible ‘from 
the inside’ . . . ‘does not in itself possess any obvious ethical signiﬁcance. Indeed, 
it is hard to cash out this ‘otherness’ in non-epistemological terms—albeit 
negatively, as that which resists knowledge’. 
 But surely, it is in the very unease that the ‘I’ experiences before the other, 
and the response that is provoked that needs an epistemological accounting. 
Ethics precedes even epistemology. One may feel indignation at the plight of 
the other and an ensuing passion for justice; one may feel pity and be moved 
to respond; one may be ﬁlled with shame, or blame, for what I could have 
done but did not do. I must give an account of myself before the other, but 
this being called to account is a fundamentally ethical provocation of the sub-
ject, before ever that original ethical situation in which I ﬁnd myself is ﬂeshed 
out into moral response. Ethics calls epistemology also to give an account of 
this original ethical situation. 
16)  Ibid., p. 30 (original italics). 
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 Th at the other is radically other is a further epistemological challenge. But 
being radically other does not mean a disincarnate or immaterial existence. 
Th e other is present in all his or her misery, with upward eyes (hence the 
appeal to me), and yet this appeal has the force of a command. I can still turn 
away and pass by on the other side, but even the decision to walk away is 
already a response, and subject to ethical judgement. Certainly, Levinas does 
present an extreme ethics of response and responsibility. 
 Salvation and the Everyday 
 Everyday existence is a preoccupation with salvation. In saying this, I do not 
want to employ the term ’salvation’—or ‘redemption’ or ‘liberation’—in any 
dogmatic sense, but more phenomenologically and existentially. I recognize 
with Levinas and against Heidegger that the ordinary hopes, joys and anxiet-
ies, and the quotidian preoccupations, are not to be dismissed as inauthentic 
or disparaged as everyday. Th e struggle for daily bread (panem quotidanem) 
is as much a daily reality as it is a prayer. It seems to me that the ordinary and 
the everyday is the lot of most people. In this sense, Levinas does broaden 
the sense of what it means to ﬁnd oneself incarnate in the world, a particular 
incarnation of which I was neither author nor arbiter either in terms of time 
or place. 
